Academic Articles

Some of the relevant academic research we have published:


Ulrike Hahn

Hahn, U. (2020) Argument quality in real world argumentation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

Merdes, C., von Sydow, M. & Hahn, U. (in press). Formal models of source reliability. Synthese.

Skovgaard-Olsen, N., Kellen, D., Hahn, U. & Klauer, K.C. (2019). Norm conflicts and conditionals. Psychological Review, 126(5), 611–633.

Hahn, U., von Sydow, M. & Merdes, C. (2019) How Communication Can Make Voters Choose Less Well. Topics in Cognitive Science. 11, 194-206.

Hahn, U., Merdes, C. & von Sydow, M. (2018) How good is your evidence and how would you know? Topics in Cognitive Science, 10 (4), 660-678.

Hahn, U., Hansen, J.U. & Olsson, E.J. (2018) Truth tracking performance of social networks: how connectivity and clustering can make groups less competent. Synthese (2018).

Harris, A.J.L., Sildmäe  O., Speekenbrink, M. & Hahn, U. (2019) The potential power of experience in communications of expert consensus levels. Journal of Risk Research, 22, 593-609.

Collins, P.J., Hahn, U., von Gerber, Y. & Olsson, E.J. (2018) The Bi-directional Relationship Between Source Characteristics and Message Content, Frontiers in Psychology, section Cognition.

Hahn, U., Blum, R., & Zenker, F. (2017) Causal Argument. In, M. Waldmann (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Causal Cognition.

Collins, P.J. & Hahn, U. (2017) Fallacies of argumentation. In. Thompson, V. and Ball, L. (eds.) International Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. Psychology Press.

Collins, P.J. & Hahn, U. (2017). Arguments and their sources. In Paglieri, F. (ed.) The psychology of argument: cognitive approaches to argumentation and persuasion. Studies in Logic and Argumentation, College Publications, London

Hahn, Ulrike and Hornikx, J. (2016) A normative framework for argument quality: argumentation schemes with a Bayesian foundation. Synthese 193 (6), pp. 1833-1873. ISSN 0039-7857.

Hahn, Ulrike and Harris, A.J.L. and Corner, A. (2016) Public reception of climate science: coherence, reliability, and independenceTopics in Cognitive Science 8 (1), pp. 180-195. ISSN 1756-8757.

Jönsson, M.L. and Hahn, Ulrike and Olsson, E.J. (2015) The kind of group you want to belong to: effects of group structure on group accuracy. Cognition 142 , pp. 191-204. ISSN 0010-0277.

Maio, G.R., Hahn, U., Frost, J-M., Kuppens, Rehman, T.N., & Kamble, S. (2014). Social Values as Arguments: Similar is Convincing. Frontiers in Psychology.

Hahn, Ulrike (2014) The Bayesian boom: good thing or bad? Frontiers in Psychology 5 , p. 765. ISSN 1664-1078.

Corner, A. and Hahn, Ulrike (2013) Normative theories of argumentation: are some norms better than others? Synthese 190 (16), pp. 3579-3610. ISSN 0039-7857.

Hahn, U., Oaksford, M. & Harris, A.J.L. (2013). Testimony and argument: A Bayesian perspective. In, Zenker, F. (ed). Bayesian Argumentation. Springer Library. pp. 15- 38.

Oaksford, M. & Hahn, U. (2013). Why are we convinced by the ad hominem argument? Source reliability or pragma-dialectics? In, Zenker, F. (ed). Bayesian Argumentation. Springer Library. pp. 39-58.

Harris, A.J.L. and Corner, A.J. and Hahn, Ulrike (2013) James is polite and punctual (and useless): a Bayesian formalisation of faint praise.  Thinking & Reasoning19 (3-4), pp. 414-429. ISSN 1354-6783.

Hahn, Ulrike and Harris, A.J.L. and Oaksford, Michael (2013) Rational argument, rational inference. Argument & Computation 4 (1), pp. 21-35. ISSN 1946-2166.

Evans, L. and Maio, G.R. and Corner, A. and Hodgetts, C.J. and Ahmed, S. and Hahn, Ulrike (2012) Self-interest and pro-environmental behaviour. Nature Climate Change 3 (2), pp. 122-125. ISSN 1758-678X.

Hahn, U. & Oaksford, M. (2012). Rational Argument. In, Morrison and Holyoak (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. pp. 277-298.

Hornikx, J. and Hahn, Ulrike (2012) Reasoning and argumentation: towards an integrated psychology of argumentation. Thinking & Reasoning 18 (3), pp. 225-243. ISSN 1354-6783.

Hahn, Ulrike (2011) The problem of circularity in evidence, argument, and explanationPerspectives on Psychological Science 6 (2), pp. 172-182. ISSN 1745-6916.

Corner, A. and Hahn, U. and Oaksford, M. (2011) The psychological mechanism of the slippery slope argument. Journal of Memory and Language 64 (2), pp. 133-152. ISSN 0749-596X.

Corner, A. and Hahn, Ulrike (2010) Message Framing, Normative Advocacy and Persuasive Success. Argumentation 24 (2), pp. 153-163. ISSN 0920-427X.

Chater, N., Oaksford, M., Heit, E., & Hahn, U. (2010) Inductive logic and empirical psychology. In S. Hartmann, & J. Woods (Eds.), The Handbook of Philosophical Logic (Volume 10), Berlin: Springer-Verlag. pp. 553-620.

Hahn, U., Harris, A.J.L., & Corner, A.J. (2009). Argument Content and Argument Source: An Exploration. Informal Logic, 29, 337-367.

Harris, A.J.L. & Hahn, U. (2009) Bayesian rationality in evaluating multiple testimonies: Incorporating the role of coherence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 35, 1366-73.

Corner, A.J. & Hahn, U. (2009) Evaluating Science Arguments: Evidence, Uncertainty & Argument Strength. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 15, 199-212.

Hahn, U. & Oaksford, M. (2008) Inference from absence in language and thought. In , N. Chater and M. Oaksford (eds.) The Probabilistic Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 121-142.

Oaksford, M., Chater, N., & Hahn, U. (2008). Human reasoning and argumentation: The probabilistic approach. In J. Adler, & L. Rips (Eds.), Reasoning: Studies of human inference and its foundations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 383-413.

Oaksford, M. & Hahn U. (2007) Induction, Deduction and Argument Strength in Human Reasoning and Argumentation. In A., Feeney & E., Heit  (Eds.)  Inductive reasoning.  Cambridge University Press. pp. 269-301.

Corner, A. & Hahn, U. (2007) Evaluating the Meta-Slope: Is there a Slippery Slope Argument against Slippery Slope Arguments? Argumentation, 21, 349-359.

Hahn, U. & Oaksford, M. (2007) The burden of proof and its role in argumentation. Argumentation, 21, 39-61.

Hahn, U. & Oaksford, M. (2007) The Rationality of Informal Argumentation: A Bayesian Approach to Reasoning Fallacies. Psychological Review, 114, 704-732.

Hahn, U. & Oaksford, M. (2006) Why a normative theory of argument strength and why might one want it to be Bayesian? Informal Logic, 26,1-24.

Hahn, U. & Oaksford, M. (2006) A Bayesian Approach to Informal Reasoning Fallacies. Synthese, 152, 207-23.

Oaksford, M., & Hahn, U. (2004) A Bayesian approach to the argument from ignorance. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58, 121-131.


Jens Koed Madsen

Madsen, J.K. (2019) The psychology of micro-targeted election campaigns. Palgrave MacMillan.

Madsen, J.K., Hahn, U. & Pilditch, T.D. (2018) Partial source dependence and reliability revision: the impact of shared backgrounds. Proceedings of the 40th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society.

Madsen, J. K., Hahn, U., & Vorms, M. (2016) The dilution effect: Conversational basis and witness reliability. Proceedings of the 38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. pp 2663-2668

Madsen, J.K. and Pilditch, T.D. (2018) A method for evaluating cognitively informed micro-targeted campaign strategies: An agent-based model proof of principlePLoS One, 13(4).

Harris, A., Hahn, U., Madsen, J.K. and Hsu, A. (2015) The Appeal to Expert Opinion: Quantitative support for a Bayesian Network ApproachCognitive Science: A Multidisciplinary Journal, 39(7): 1-38.

Madsen, J.K. (2015) Modelling Political Source Credibility of Election Candidates in the USA.Noelle, D.C., Dale, R., Warlaumont, A.S., Yoshimi, J., Matlock, T., Jennings, C.D. and Maglio, P.P. (eds.) Proceedings of the 37th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society Cognitive Science Society.. 1470-1476.

Madsen, J.K. (2013) A Cognitive Supplement to Rhetorical Theory. In, Belle, H.v., Gillaerts, P., Gorp, B.v., Mieroop, D.v.d. and Rutten, K. (eds.) Verbal and Visual Rhetoric in a Media World. Leiden University Press, Amsterdam.

Harris, A., Hsu, A. and Madsen, J.K. (2012) Because Hitler did it! Quantitative tests of Bayesian argumentation using Ad HominemThinking and Reasoning, 18(3): 311-343.


Stefan Schubert

Schubert, S. (2014). “The Center for Applied Rationality: Practical Techniques for Overcoming Biases”, The Reasoner, 8, pp. 134-135.

Schubert, S. and Olsson, E. J. (2013). “Coherence and Reliability in Judicial Reasoning”in Araszkiewicz, M. (ed.)Coherence. Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence, pp. 33-58. Springer.

Schubert, S. (2012). “Coherence reasoning and reliability: a defense of the Shogenji measure”, Synthese, 187, pp. 305-319.

Schubert, S. (2011). “Coherence and Reliability: The Case of Overlapping Testimonies”, Erkenntnis, 74, pp. 263-275.

Olsson, E. J. och Schubert, S. (2007). “Reliability conducive measures of coherence”, Synthese, 157, pp. 297-308.